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Abstract 
 
This paper presents new non-linear regression estimates of the relationship 
between inflation and economic growth for 80 countries over the period 1961 – 2000.  
We perform tests using the full sample of countries as well as sub-samples consisting of 
OECD countries, middle-income countries, and low-income countries.  We also consider 
the full sample of countries within the four separate decades between 1961 – 2000.   
Considering our full data set we consistently find that higher inflation is associated with 
moderate gains in GDP growth up to a roughly 15 – 18 percent inflation threshold.  
However, the findings diverge when we divide our full data set according to income 
levels.  With the OECD countries, no clear pattern emerges at all with either the inflation 
coefficient or our estimated turning point.  With the middle income countries, we return 
to a consistently positive pattern of inflation coefficients, though none are statistically 
significant.  The turning points range within a narrow band in this sample, between 14 – 
16 percent.  With the low income countries, we obtain positive and higher coefficient 
values on the inflation coefficient than with the middle-income countries.  With the 
groupings by decade, the results indicate that inflation and growth will be more highly 
correlated to the degree that macroeconomic policy is focused on demand management as 
a stimulus to growth.  We consider the implications of these findings for the conduct of 
monetary policy.  One is that there is no justification for inflation-targeting policies as 
they are currently being practiced throughout the middle- and low-income countries, that 
is, to maintain inflation with a 3 – 5 percent band.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
 This paper presents new cross-country evidence between 1961 – 2000 on the 
relationship between inflation and economic growth.    Despite the central importance of 
this inflation-growth relationship for macroeconomic theory and policy, there is nothing 
close to a professional consensus as to what the empirical evidence tells us about this 
relationship.   
 
 The results we present here have direct relevance to the debate on inflation 
targeting as an appropriate framework for conducting monetary policy.  Over the past 
decade, governments throughout the world have embraced inflation targeting as a 
dominant policy framework.  For the most part, this specifically means that they have set 
a low band of acceptable inflation rates as a primary target in the conduct of economic 
policy.  This band is usually between a 3 – 5 percent annual inflation rate.  They have 
then maintained sufficiently high short-term interest rates as the intermediate policy 
instrument for preventing inflation from exceeding that target band.  Higher interest rates 
are aimed, in turn, at reducing economic growth.  Slower economic growth should then 
dampen inflationary pressures.  At least in the short-run, the costs in terms of slower 
growth of containing inflation within this 3 – 5 percent band are evident.  But proponents 
of inflation targeting hold that, over a longer-term framework, maintaining low inflation 
will itself yield benefits for growth that exceed these short-term costs.1 
 
 Some limitations of inflation targeting have been widely recognized by 
mainstream economists and even U.S. central bankers Ben Bernanke and Alan Blinder 
(see Bernanke, Laubach, Posen and Mishkin 1999; and Blinder 1998).  The Bernanke/Blinder 
view is that inflation targeting does not provide an approach to maintaining low inflation 
that is clearly superior to other approaches.   This is true as such, but this concern about 
inflation targeting as an operating procedure alone begs a more important question.  This 
crucial question is whether maintaining inflation within a band of 3 – 5 percent itself is, 
as a generalization, supportive of economic growth, regardless of the technique being 
used to maintain inflation within that low band.  It is this broader question that we 
address in this paper.  That is, are countries making sacrifices in terms of their economic 
growth path by focusing macroeconomic policy on maintaining inflation at no more than 
3 – 5 percent?   
 
 In Section 2, we briefly review the overarching and longstanding analytic debates 
on the relationship between inflation and economic growth, then focus specifically on the 
recent econometric research that has explored that relationship.  In Section 3, we present 
basic descriptive data from our data sample, then examine the main results from our 
various economic exercises.  In the concluding Section 4, we consider the broader 
implications of our findings, especially as they relate to policy debates around inflation 
targeting and possible alternative approaches to inflation control.   
 
                                                 
1 An excellent survey of inflation-targeting and related issues in global monetary macroeconomics is Saad 
Filho (2005) 
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2.  Literature Overview 
 
Analytic perspectives 
We begin by separating out the phenomenon of hyperinflation, which we  broadly 
define as being annual inflation rates in excess of 40 percent per year.  Hyperinflations 
occur through a variety of specific factors.  But regardless of their specific origins, 
hyperinflations represent a breakdown of economic functionings.  We will assume that 
hyperinflations correspond with, and are detrimental to, a positive economic growth path. 
We are therefore leaving aside here the possibility that there may be some positive 
correspondence between inflation above 40 percent and economic growth.   
 
Hyperinflations aside, the relationship between inflation and growth has been at 
the very center of macroeconomic theory debates since the monetarist counterrevolution 
against Keynesianism beginning in the 1960s.2  The main progeny of that 
counterrevolution—the “natural rate of unemployment,” the vertical Phillips Curve, and 
New Classical Economics more generally—have been focused largely around 
demonstrating that there can be no positive benefits for economic growth or employment 
of operating an economy at anything above a minimal inflation rate in the range of 2 – 3 
percent.   From this perspective, inflation impedes efficient resource allocation by 
obscuring the signaling role of relative price changes, which, in turn, is the most 
important guide to efficient economic decision-making. 
 
This position contrasts sharply with the Keynesian perspective and the early 
Phillips Curve models, which held that inflation and economic growth can be positively 
associated when inflationary pressures emerge as a byproduct of rising aggregate 
demand.   In this Keynesian framework, it is not the case that inflation is itself a positive 
engine of growth, certainly not a primary growth-inducing force.  The point is rather that, 
if rising aggregate demand is leading to increased growth, then some inflationary 
pressures are likely to emerge in this scenario as a relatively benign byproduct.  Within 
this Keynesian framework, there could also be reasons for inflation and growth to be 
negatively correlated.   This would occur when inflation results from monopolistic 
pricing practices, exchange rate volatility or supply shocks.   These problems can also be 
compounded when adequate policy interventions do not occur to dampen the inflationary 
impulses induced by monopolistic pricing, exchange rate volatility or supply shocks.    
 
Recent Empirical Studies 
 
Probably the most influential recent contribution to the econometric literature on 
inflation and growth is that of Bruno and Easterly (with results presented in both Bruno 
1995 and Bruno and Easterly 1998).  Bruno and Easterly examined the relationship 
between inflation and economic growth for 127 countries between 1960 and 1992.   Their 
examination of this data set is historical and descriptive.  They do not present a formal 
econometric model. 
 
                                                 
2 The literature on this issue is of course vast.  Three references offering different perspectives are Cross 
(1995)  Krueger and Solow (2001) and Saad Filho (2005).    
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Their key conclusion was that there is no robust evidence from this data sample 
demonstrating a trade-off between output growth and inflation.  More specifically, only 
on the basis of two conditions could one observe a negative growth-inflation relationship 
at all in their data sample.  These were: 1) the inclusion in the data sample of very high 
inflation experiences, i.e. rates of inflation of 40 percent and higher; and 2) increasing the 
frequency of the data observations.  As they write, “The results get stronger as one goes 
from the cross-section to ten year averages to five year averages to annual data,” (1998, 
p. 4). 
 
Once one controls for these two factors, Bruno and Easterly found that average 
growth rates fell only slightly as inflation rates moved up to 20 – 25 percent.  For 
inflation rates below 20 percent, Bruno concluded that “there is no obvious empirical 
evidence for significant long-run growth costs,” (Bruno 1995, p. 38).  Moreover, of 
particular importance for our concerns with aggregate demand effects on inflation and 
growth, Bruno found that during 1960 – 72, economic growth on average increased as 
inflation rose, from negative or low rates to the 15 – 20 percent range.  This is because, as 
Bruno explained, “in the 1950s and 1960s, low-to-moderate inflation went hand in hand 
with very rapid growth because of investment demand pressures in an expanding 
economy,” (1995, p. 35).  Thus, inflation that results directly from economic expansion 
does not, according to Bruno’s findings, create any significant barriers to expansion. 
 
Despite these findings, Bruno still makes clear in his single-authored paper that he 
does not advocate complacency with respect to inflation rates in the 20 percent region.  
According to Bruno, once inflation moves into the 20 percent region, it is difficult to 
contain at this level.  This is because, within the 20 percent inflation region, the systems 
of indexing wages and financial assets, as well as exchange rate adjustments, become 
more frequent.  This then creates a momentum toward accelerating inflation.   
 
Neither Bruno alone nor Bruno and Easterly provide systematic evidence in 
behalf of Bruno’s concerns about inflation within the 20 percent region.  Nevertheless, 
Bruno is clear in his conclusion that “getting inflation down to single digits is important 
even for longer-term growth reasons,” (p. 38).    But even within this less systematic 
discussion on the dangers of inflation in the 20 percent range, it is still notable that Bruno 
never suggests that inflation needs to be pushed below a single-digit threshold—and 
specifically down into the 3 – 5 percent range advocated by proponents of inflation 
targeting. 
 
Since the Bruno and Easterly study, various researchers have examined the output 
growth-inflation relationship through more formal techniques than those employed by 
Bruno and Easterly while still searching out, as with Bruno and Easterly, potential non-
linearities.  For example, in a 1998 paper, IMF economists Atish Ghosh and Steven 
Phillips combine panel regression techniques with non-linear treatment of the inflation-
growth relationship.  They also utilize a decision-tree technique that, in their view, is 
more robust to outliers and non-linearities than is standard regression analysis.  Their 
model draws from a data sample of IMF member countries over 1960 – 96.    According 
to this model, they find evidence of a negative inflation threshold at 2 ½ percent.  But 
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they also acknowledge that thresholds of 5 or 10 percent generate statistical results very 
similar to the 2 ½ percent threshold. 
 
A 2001 paper by two separate IMF economists Moshin Khan and Abdelhak 
Senhadji offers two innovations relative to Ghosh and Phillips.  The first is their use of 
conditional least squares, a new non-linear estimation technique,.  The second, and more 
straightforward innovation was to divide their data sample into industrial and developing 
countries.  Based on this approach, they find that the threshold level above which 
inflation significantly slows growth is 1 -3 percent for industrial countries and 11 – 12 
percent for developing countries.   
 
More recently still, a 2004 paper by Burdekin, Denzau, Kiel, Sitthiyot, and Willett 
followed Khan and Senhadji in allowing for different threshold effects among the 
industrial and developing countries.  They also allow for non-linearities in the growth-
inflation relationship through utilizing spline estimation techniques.   The results from 
this research diverge sharply from Khan and Senhadji.  In terms of point estimates, they 
found that the turning point for industrial countries was eight percent while that for 
developing countries was three percent.   
 
In short, all of these studies are in broad concurrence with Bruno and Easterly as 
to the presence of non-linearities in the growth-inflation relationship.  They also broadly 
concur with Bruno’s conclusion that the negative effects of inflation will occur 
somewhere below a 20 percent threshold, most likely in the single-digit range.  However, 
they diverge sharply as to where the turning point occurs within a range of roughly 12 
percent inflation or less.  Moreover, the two studies that adopted the simple innovation of 
dividing the sample between industrial and developing countries reached opposite 
conclusions as to which set of countries had a higher inflation threshold.  Thus, despite 
the deployment of sophisticated techniques for capturing the impact of non-linearities in 
the growth-inflation relationship, major questions remain unresolved.  In particular, there 
remains no robust evidence in support of a policy goal of maintaining an inflation target 
in the range of 3 – 5 percent.    
 
 
3.  Descriptive Data and Econometric Evidence 
 
 Our own model is a straightforward panel data model, in which we aim to isolate 
the effects of inflation on economic growth through including a series of control variables 
as well as allowing for a non-linear component to the growth-inflation relationship.  Our 
data sample runs from 1961 – 2000, including data from a total of 80 countries.  We have 
excluded from the model countries whose population is less than 2 million people.  We 
do this to focus our empirical exercises on countries whose economies are minimally 
large enough so that the countries’ patterns of economic activity can be understood as 
having features that are distinct to that country.  The appendix to the paper provides a full 
list of the countries in our data sample. 
 
 Descriptive statistics 
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 We first provide some basic descriptive statistics from our data sample, provided 
both in Table 1 and Figure 1.  Table 1 shows both means and standard deviations for 
inflation and growth, for the full sample, and broken out according to our three income-
level groupings.  For all countries in the sample, as we see, the average rate of GDP 
growth is 1.9 percent and the average inflation rate is 10.2 percent.  However, from the 
standard deviations—2.7 percent for GDP growth and 7.2 percent for inflation—we also 
see that there are wide disparities among the observations in the sample. 
 
TABLE 1 BELONGS HERE 
 
 The disparities do diminish as we break out the full sample of countries into 
income-level groupings.  Not surprisingly, the OECD countries experience the highest 
average rate of economic growth (virtually by definition; see footnote #3)  and the lowest 
average inflation rates.  Average growth is significantly faster in the middle-income 
countries relative to the low-income countries, but average inflation is somewhat lower in 
the low-income countries. 
 
 The four scatter plots in Figure 1 show the range of values for our data sample 
more fully.  No strong patterns at all emerge from these figures in terms of the 
inflation/GDP growth relationship.  Of course, these data plots do not control for factors 
other than inflation that could be affecting economic growth. 
 
FIGURE 1 BELONGS HERE 
 
 We label in the four diagrams the data points that emerge as outliers through 
simple observation.  This provides some useful perspective.  For example, with the full 
set of countries, the most rapid growth spurt was experienced by Haiti from 1996 – 2000.  
Haiti grew on average by 15.2 percent in this period, even while inflation was rising at an 
average of 14.9 percent.  In terms of other outliers in the all-country diagram, we see that 
the very high inflation and/or very low growth outliers are all low- or middle-income 
countries, with Rwanda, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe all experiencing severe political 
conflicts during their low growth/high inflation years. 
 
 With the OECD and middle-income country diagrams, we see that the countries 
able to experience the most rapid economic growth rates were Japan, Ireland, South 
Korea, and China.  In all cases, the rapid GDP growth was tied to reaching new levels of 
export success.  Inflation in these countries over the relevant years ranged widely, 
between 2.6 and 13.2 percent.  Clearly, it is difficult to offer generalizations from these 
figures as to the interrelationship between inflation and economic growth.  It is evident 
that we need to examine this relationship more systematically, the task to which we now 
turn. 
 
 Econometric model 
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Our approach has been to build a formal model that is still consistent with the 
main strength of the Bruno-Easterly framework, which is its simplicity.  To do this, we 
work with a panel model that incorporates non-linearities through two relatively simple 
procedures.   
 
 The first feature of our non-linear model is to simply exclude from our data set all 
observations in which inflation exceeded 40 percent.  As we mention above, we accept 
the finding of Bruno and Easterly that inflation in that high range will produce negative 
effects on growth.   We are therefore effectively asking with our model whether an 
annual inflation rate below 40 percent exerts a negative effect on economic growth, and if 
so, at what point are such negative effects likely to emerge? 
 
 The second way that we introduce non-linearity in our model is to include the 
squared term on inflation as an explanatory variable, which means we are estimating the 
regression equations as a second-degree polynomial.  This is a straightforward, widely 
used technique for estimating non-linear relationships, through allowing for changes in 
slopes as a function of changes in the independent variable.  In this case, the slope of the 
estimating equation can vary with changes in the inflation rate.  This enables us to 
observe turning points in the relationship between inflation-growth and inflation-equality.  
We can observe such possible turning points through this calculation: 
 
Turning point =   - ((inflation coefficient) / (2*(inflation-squared coefficient)).  
 
 Within this framework, we then also pursue robustness tests through three sets of 
straightforward procedures: 
 
 A)  We utilize four different panel data techniques:  pooled OLS, between effects, 
fixed effects, and random effects.  In principle, researchers are supposed to establish 
through diagnostic exercises which of the four techniques is appropriate with a given data 
sample.  In practice, however, it is frequently difficult to know which technique is the 
most reliable.  Each of the techniques has both strengths and weaknesses.  A pooled OLS 
model implicitly assumes there are no problems of omitted variables in a model, which is 
not likely to be true, even through frequently the problems may not be serious enough to 
substantially distort one’s results.  A between-effects model averages the data for each 
country into one observation.  It is therefore testing more narrowly for variation on a 
country-by-country basis, as opposed to considering variation between time periods as 
well as countries.  With the fixed effects model, we are allowing for intercept shifts to 
occur for each country, based on the range of possible omitted variables in evaluating 
country-by-country determinants of economic growth.  But the fixed effects model 
effectively creates dummy variables for each country in the sample, which reduces 
degrees of freedom.  Finally, the random effects model also allows for a different 
intercept for each country in the sample.  But the random effects model isolates these 
individual country effects in the error term, and therefore does not reduce degrees of 
freedom in the manner of the fixed effects estimator.  But at the same time, to be an 
unbiased estimator, the random effects model requires that the omitted variable effects 
will be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.   
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Given this range of concerns with the various techniques, we report results 
utilizing all four techniques.  By examining results generated by all four techniques, we 
are able to assess the robustness of our findings across the range of panel data estimators.   
 
 B)  We run regressions both on the full set of countries as one sample, then 
through dividing the countries into three groupings, OECD countries, middle-income 
countries, and low-income countries.  We are therefore able to observe the extent to 
which differences in the results are due to broad differences in the various countries’ 
level of development, as distinct from the individual country differences that we control 
for through the fixed- and random-effects models.3  
 
 C)  We decompose the full time period into four decade-long sub-periods.  This 
enables us to examine how the relationships may have changed over time.  We are 
especially interested in following up on Bruno’s observation that inflation and growth 
were positively correlated during from the 1960s up until the 1973 oil shock.  This was a 
period in which, as Bruno said, inflation emerged out of explicit efforts to stimulate 
aggregate demand.  
 
 Beyond these distinct features of our model, we also incorporate a set of control 
variables in each specification of the model.  These control variables are standard in 
cross-country estimates of the determinants of economic growth.  They include 1) the 
initial level of GDP; 2) the share of investment spending in GDP; 3) the share of 
government spending in GDP; 4) the fiscal deficit; 5) educational levels;  6) the level of 
overall health, as measured by life expectancy; 7) the change in terms of trade; 8) the 
effects of natural disasters; and 9) the effects of wars.  In addition, we include dummy 
variables for each year in the pooled-OLS, fixed effects, and random effects models to 
control for the time effects within each set of country observations.  Full descriptions of 
each of the control variables is reported in the appendix.  We do not report here the full 
set of results on the control variables, but these results are available on request.4   
 
 We report the key findings of our econometric models in Tables 2 and 3.  Both 
tables report the coefficients and t-statistics for the inflation and inflation-squared 
                                                 
3 Grouping the countries in the sample by average GDP levels does raise the potential for significant bias in 
the regression.  This is because the dependent variable in the model is GDP growth.  Strictly speaking, we 
are not dividing the sample based on the dependent variable, but there is obviously a close correspondence 
between the growth of GDP, our dependent variable, and GDP levels, the variable on which we truncate the 
sample.  To test for bias here, we have also divided the full sample based on pre-1960 GDP level 
groupings—that is, on the basis of data points that precede in time our sampling period.  In this case, the 
division is between current OECD countries and the non-OECD countries—that is, the demarcation 
between middle- and low-income countries was not so evident in the pre-1960 data, and only becomes 
evident over the forty years that constitute our data sample.  However, the results of this exercise do not 
vary substantially from those reported with the three GDP-level groupings reported here.  This suggests 
that any potential bias from the GDP-level groupings is not a serious problem for our substantive 
understanding of the findings. 
4 By exploring the inflation-growth relationship within this framework of a standard cross-country growth 
regression model, we are building in an assumption that causality in the relationship is running from 
inflation to growth.  We do not explore the issue of simultaneity or reverse causality in this exercise, while 
we recognize it as an important issue for further research. 
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variables only for each of the regressions.  We also report the turning points estimated by 
each equation when inflation switches from becoming a positive to negative, or negative 
to positive, influence on growth.   
 
 Results for the Full Time Period.  The results for the full time period are 
presented in Table 2.  Considering first the data for all countries in the sample, we see 
that the sign of the inflation coefficient is consistently positive across specifications, and 
is statistically significant in all but the fixed effects specification.  Moveover, the 
coefficient values across specifications are similar, ranging between 0.09 – 0.15.  The 
coefficients on the inflation-squared terms are also similar and statistically significant in 
all cases.  With the coefficients on the inflation and inflation-squared terms, we can then 
calculate the turning points as being between a 15.2 and 18.6 inflation rate.  Overall, this 
first set of tests with the full data sample suggest that the rate of economic growth rises 
by between about 0.1 and 0.15 percent for every percentage point increase in the inflation 
rate up to a 15 – 18 percent threshold.  Inflation then becomes a damper on growth 
beyond this threshold. 
 
TABLE 2 BELONGS HERE 
 
 The clear findings we obtain with the full data set is, however, not maintained 
when we consider OECD, middle-income, and low-income countries separately.  With 
the data grouped by income levels, we expect that the significance levels will go down 
due to the smaller sample sizes.  And we do indeed observe generally lower significance 
levels with the results grouped by income levels.   
 
More specifically, in the case of the OECD countries, none of the coefficients for 
inflation or inflation-squared are statistically significant in any of the specifications.  
Moreover, the signs on the inflation variable shift to negative in the pooled OLS, between 
effects and random effects models.  In short, we do not obtain any reliable results on the 
inflation-growth relationship for the OECD countries. 
 
 With the middle-income countries, the signs on the inflation coefficient are all 
positive.  However, the coefficients are insignificant in all cases, the coefficient values 
correspondingly jump from 0.06 to 0.129.  However, the estimated turning points in these 
equations are within a tight band of between 14 – 16 percent. 
 
 Finally, with the low-income countries, we do again obtain consistently positive 
coefficient values from the inflation variable.  These coefficients are also significant in 
the fixed effects and random effects models.  The coefficient values in these regressions 
are substantially higher than with the other country groupings, ranging between 0.24 and 
0.56.  The inflation-squared terms are also strongly significant in the fixed- and random-
effects models.  The turning point estimates range between 15 – 23 percent. 
  
Results by Decade.  In Table 3, we report results from regressions run separately 
for each of the four decades in our data sample.  These regressions are run with annual 
data rather than five-year averages in order to generate a larger number of observations.  
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In doing this, we recognize the point emphasized by Bruno and Easterly, that we should 
expect more of a negative correspondence between inflation and growth as we move to 
higher-frequency data samples.  This is because of the likelihood that negative effects on 
growth will occur through short bursts of high inflation rates that approach our cut-off 
figure of 40 percent.  Such short bursts of high inflation and slow or negative growth will 
be smoothed out when data are grouped at lower frequencies. 
 
TABLE 3 BELONGS HERE 
 
 One key point emerges from the results in Table 3:  that the evidence for a 
positive association between growth and inflation is far stronger in the 1961 – 70 decade 
than in subsequent decades.  For 1961 – 70, the coefficient values on inflation are all 
positive, though statistically significant only in the between-effects model.  The fixed 
effects model stands apart with a low inflation coefficient value of 0.065, but otherwise 
the coefficients for the other specifications are high, at 0.11 for the pooled OLS and 
random effects models and a very high 0.61 for the between effects model. 
 
 With the 1971 – 80 sample, the inflation coefficients remain positive, but the 
coefficient values and levels of significance fall off, especially with the random effects 
and between effects models.  For 1981 – 90, the inflation coefficients all turn negative, 
and is a statistically significant negative value in the fixed effects model.  Finally, for 
1991 – 2000, we obtain negative inflation coefficients with two tests and close to zero 
coefficients for the other two. 
 
 These results provide broad support for Bruno’s observation cited above, about 
inflation and growth moving positively together during the 1960s in correspondence with, 
as he put it, “very rapid growth because of investment demand pressures in an expanding 
economy,” (1995, p. 35).  During the 1970s, demand-management policies were still in 
favor to support growth.  But the positive associations between growth and inflation as a 
byproduct of growth in this period were undermined by the two oil price shocks in 1973 
and 1979.  The overall inflation experience of this decade therefore is a combination of 
demand-pull effects from growth and supply-side shocks.  It is therefore not surprising 
that the inflation coefficients in the 1970s fall in value and lose significance. 
 
 The 1980s marked the beginning of what Angus Maddison (2001), among others, 
has term the “neoliberal era.”  Probably the single defining feature of this era is the 
virtual abandonment by governments throughout the world of Keynesian demand 
management policies as a tool for stimulating growth and employment.  Thus, as a broad 
generalization, the inflation that is experienced in the 1980s and 1990s emerges almost 
entirely as a result of supply shocks and inertia, as opposed to demand-pull pressures.  
Within this context, it is also not surprising that the inflation coefficients become 
consistently negative, albeit generally not to a statistically significant extent.   
 
4.  Conclusions 
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 Considering first our full data set of 80 countries between 1961 - 2000, we have 
consistently found that higher inflation is associated with moderate gains in GDP growth 
up to a roughly 15 – 18 percent inflation threshold.   
 
 However, the findings diverge when we divide our full data set according to 
income levels.  With the OECD countries, no clear pattern emerges at all with either the 
inflation coefficient or our estimated turning point.  Both the signs on the inflation 
coefficients as well as the turning points are highly sensitive to specifications.   With the 
middle income countries, by contrast, we return to a consistently positive pattern of 
inflation coefficients, though none are statistically significant.  However, the turning 
points range within a narrow band in this sample, between 14.0 and 16.3 percent.  With 
the low income countries, we obtain positive and higher coefficient values on the 
inflation coefficient than with the middle-income countries.  These coefficients are also 
statistically significant with the fixed- and random-effects models.   
 
Finally, with the groupings by decade, the results broadly indicate that  inflation 
and growth will be more highly correlated to the degree that macroeconomic policy is 
focused on demand management as a stimulus to growth as opposed to macroeconomic 
austerity and inflation targeting. 
 
Overall, there is no evidence from this research supportive of a policy of 
maintaining inflation within a low band of about 3 – 5 percent, to the degree that 
government policymakers are interested in promoting economic growth and employment, 
rather than merely low inflation as an end in itself.  At the same time, there is also no 
evidence that governments should allow inflation to rise above a 15 – 20 percent range in 
an effort to spur growth. 
 
This suggests that there is still a wide range of inflation rates that are very likely 
to be associated positively with economic growth.  Certainly for the middle- and low-
income countries, our results strongly suggest that allowing inflation to be maintained in  
range of 10 percent or somewhat higher is very likely to be consistent with higher rates of 
economic growth.  This is most especially the case when inflation is resulting from, as 
Bruno put it, “investment demand pressures in an expanding economy.” 
 
For the OECD countries, the primary conclusion that we can reach from our 
results is a negative one:  that no generalization about the inflation-growth relationship is 
likely to find robust support from the available evidence.  What appears likely for the 
OECD countries is that the wide range of relationships that emerge from the data reflect 
the differences in the sources of inflation—that is, whether inflation has resulted 
primarily from Keynesian type demand-pull forces as opposed to supply shocks and 
inertia. 
 
Some broad policy implications flow from these results.  The first is that there is 
no justification for inflation-targeting policies as they are currently being practiced 
throughout the world, that is, to maintain inflation with a 3 – 5 percent band and to adjust  
short-term interest rates as needed to dampen inflationary pressures beyond that targeted 
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band.    As a corollary,  there is very likely to be positive growth benefits in middle- and 
low-income countries from allowing inflation to rise to a high-single digit range or even 
in some cases up to about 15 percent rather than dampening inflationary pressures 
through raising short-term interest rates.  This is especially true to the extent that inflation 
within this range is resulting from demand-pull forces as opposed to supply shocks and 
inertia.5     
 
A second implication is that researchers are likely to make productive 
contributions through giving increased attention on the inflation-growth relationship to 
some relatively under-explored aspects of the issue.  The first is to be able to sort out with 
increased specificity the sources of inflationary pressures, given the likely wide 
disparities in the inflation-growth relationship depending on what is fueling inflation.  A 
second is to focus more on policy measures for dampening inflation not at very low 
levels, but rather at levels approaching the upper limit of the positive growth-inflation 
association.  This would be in the range of 10 - 15 percent for middle- and low-income 
countries.  With the OECD countries, the acceptable range is likely to depend entirely on 
what are the primary sources of inflationary pressures.   
 
One well-known policy tool for maintaining inflationary pressures within a 
positive threshold range is some variation of incomes policies.  Incomes policies have 
been widely used as an inflation control tool in a variety of contexts.  One common 
situation has been in bringing down inflation after it has risen to a range above 40 
percent.  For example, in their paper “Moderate Inflation,” (1991) Dornbusch and Fischer 
describe how Mexico in the 1980s drew upon experiences in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and 
Israel in developing a strategy to bring inflation down from the 100 percent range to 
something closer to 20 percent.  Dornbusch and Fischer reported that the Mexicans 
learned two lessons from these experiences, 1) “that disinflation without fiscal discipline 
was unsustainable;” but that 2) “disinflation without incomes policy, relying solely on 
tight money and tight  budgets, would be unnecessarily expensive,” (p. 31).  In analyzing 
the Israeli experience with disinflation over the 1980s, Bruno documents in detail the 
major contributions of incomes policies to the success of the effort (1993, Chapter 5). 
 
 A more directly relevant set of experiences with respect to inflations at more 
moderate levels have been the Nordic countries.  This is because, in these countries, 
incomes policies have been used successfully as a tool for maintaining relatively low 
inflation over long periods of time rather than as primarily an instrument of disinflation 
after inflation exceeded 40 percent, as was true with Mexico and Israel.  Sweden, for 
example, succeeded in maintaining unemployment at an average rate below 2 percent 
between 1951 – 2000 while still holding inflation at a 4.4 percent average rate.  The 
application of incomes policies in Sweden, moreover, primarily took the form of 
centralized bargaining between unions and business, through which the aim of inflation 
control was recognized in the bargaining process.  As such, the government did not have 
to rely on setting mandates for acceptable wage and price increases.  The government did 
                                                 
5 Even some of the most recent work by IMF economists has recognized that, at least for the low-income 
countries, inflation in the range of 5 – 10 percent is likely to be supportive of economic growth.  See IMF 
(2005). 
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also utilize fiscal and monetary policies as tools for controlling inflation.  But they did 
not have to apply these tools stringently, precisely because they were able to rely on their 
well-developed system of incomes policies as a complement to monetary and fiscal 
policies.6   
  
 The most basic critique of incomes policies is that, in order for the approach to 
have any chance of success, it is necessary that a country operate with a high level of 
organization among workers, and that there be some reasonable degree of common 
ground between workers and business.    Otherwise, there will be no realistic prospect for 
economy-wide bargaining to yield results that will be honored widely. By its very nature, 
the relationship between unions and business in capitalist economies is likely to be highly 
contentious.  But this could possibly diminish to the extent that both sides see the benefits 
accelerated economic growth and employment expansion as opposed to maintaining tight 
monetary policy for the purpose of holding inflation within a 3 – 5 percent band.  
 
 This point brings us to a final issue for further research that includes both purely 
analytic as well as policy-oriented implications.  This is to examine the relationship 
between inflation and inequality in addition to the inflation/growth relationship.  To the 
extent that inflation is associated with faster economic growth, it is likely to also be 
correlated with faster employment growth and thereby increased equality.  At the same 
time, to the extent that wage agreements and social benefits do not include adequate cost-
of-living adjustments, even a growth-generated inflation could yield greater inequality.  
In terms of policy implications, the issues that are central in the exploration of the 
inflation-inequality relationship will also be closely linked to the question of inflation 
control policies.  For example, are incomes policies or inflation targeting a more effective 
means of promoting greater equality as well as economic growth?  These are crucial 
questions that deserve substantial additional research in an effort to design more effective 
analytic foundations for the conduct of macroeconomic policy.   
                                                 
6 Different perspectives on the Nordic experiences are presented in Calmfors (1993), Pekkarinen, Pohjola, 
and  Rowthorn (1992), Flanigan (1999), Marshall (1994), and Iversen, Pontusson and Soskice (2000).  
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APPENDIX 
 
Countries Included In Data Pool For Analyzing The  
Inflation/Economic Growth Relationship 
Data Sample is 1960 - 2001 
 
OECD Countries Middle Income Countries Non-OECD 
High Income 
Countries 
Low Income 
Countries 
Australia Algeria Paraguay Israel Bangladesh 
Austria Argentina Peru Singapore Burundi 
Belgium Bolivia Philippines  Cameroon 
Canada Brazil Poland  Central Afr. R. 
Denmark Chile South 
Africa 
 Congo 
Finland China Sri Lanka  Ghana 
France Colombia Syria  Haiti 
Greece Costa Rica Thailand  India 
Ireland Dominican Rep. Tunisia  Indonesia 
Italy Ecuador Uruguay  Kenya 
Japan Egypt Venezuela  Lesotho 
Korea El Salvador   Malawi 
Netherlands Guatemala   Mali 
New Zealand Honduras   Nepal 
Norway Hungary   Nicaragua 
Portugal Iran, I.R. of   Niger 
Spain Jamaica   Pakistan 
Sweden Jordan   Papua New Guin.
Switzerland Malaysia   Rwanda 
United Kingdom Mexico   Senegal 
United States Panama   Sierra Leone 
    Togo 
    Uganda 
    Zaire 
    Zimbabwe 
 15
 
Specifications of Variables In The Full Inflation/Economic Growth Model  
 
Economic Growth. Real GDP per capita (Constant price: Laspeyres) Growth rate. The nth year’s 
growth rate is calculated as the log value of the ratio of the nth year’s per capita GDP to the (n-
1)th year’s per capita GDP. (Source: PWT6.1. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. ) 
 
Inflation. The increase of consumer price index. (Source: WDI2003) 
 
Initial Output Level. The log value of per capita GDP (Constant price: Laspeyres) at the 
beginning year of each period. (Source: PWT6.1. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.) 
 
Investment. The share of gross investment in GDP (current prices). (Source: PWT6.1. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. ). 
 
Fiscal Policy. 1)  The share of government consumption in GDP (current prices). (Source: 
PWT6.1. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/). 2) Government budget deficit as percentage of GDP, 
(Source: WDI 2003) 
 
Life Expectancy. Life expectancy at birth. (Source: WDI CD-ROM 2003, World Bank.) 
 
Education Level. Average years of secondary schooling in the of the total population aged 25 and 
over. (Source: Barro R. and J.W. Lee, 
2000.http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/barrolee/panel_data.xls) 
 
Terms of Trade.  . The change of terms of trade weighted by foreign trade dependence ratio (the 
sum of exports and imports divided by GDP). (Easterly, et al. 2002. Global Development 
Network Growth Database, http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm.) 
  
Natural Disaster. The share of population affected by the natural disasters happened in the year 
weighted by the share of agricultural output in GDP. Unreported natural disasters, if any, are 
treated as 0. (Sources: The natural disaster data come from The Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 
http://www.cred.be/emdat/intro.htm. The agricultural data are from WDI 2003.) 
 
War.  A war is defined as an armed conflict with more than 25 deaths. Value 1 is given to those 
countries experienced war within its border, -1 given to those countries involved into war in other 
countries. Other situations are given value 0. (Source: Gleditsch, et al., 2002, Armed Conflict 
1946–2002 database. http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/) 
 
Note: All variables are averaged over 5-year period in the full period regressions presented in 
Table 2.  Annual data are used in the decade-by-decade regressions presented in Table 3.    
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics on GDP Growth and Inflation 
80-Country Sample, 1961 – 2000 
 
(figures are percentages) 
 All countries 
(80 countries) 
OECD 
countries 
(21 countries) 
Middle-income 
countries 
(32 countries) 
Low-income 
Countries 
(25 countries) 
 
GDP growth 
 
    
  Mean 1.9 2.6 1.8 0.9
  Standard    
deviation 
 
2.7 1.8 2.7 3.4
Inflation 
 
    
  Mean 10.2 7.0 12.8 11.3
  Standard   
deviation  
7.2 4.9 8.3 6.6
 
Source:  See Appendix. 
Note:  Israel and Singapore are not included in the country-groupings because they are non-OECD high-
income countries. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Inflation and Economic Growth, 1961 -2000 
Data grouped as five-year averages 
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth 
(t-statistics in parentheses; P<0.05 = *, P<0.01 = **) 
 All Countries OECD Countries  
Model : Pooled-OLS Fixed  Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects Pooled-OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects 
# obs : 356 356 356 80 135 135 135 21 
Inflation 0.11* 0.091 0.11* 0.149* -0.055 0.025 -0.034 -0.130 
 (2.49) (1.61) (2.55) (1.99) (-0.66) (0.23) (-0.36) (-0.30) 
(Inflation)2 -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** -0.004* -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 0.001 
 (-3.73) (-2.41) (-3.42) (-2.35) (-1.43) (-1.79) (-1.37) (0.06) 
Turning  
Point 18.3 15.2 18.3 18.6 -5.5 1.8 -3.4 65.0 
 
 Middle-Income Countries Low-Income Countries 
Model : Pooled-OLS Fixed  Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects 
Pooled-
OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects 
# obs : 127 127 127 32 86 86 86 25 
Inflation 0.06 0.028 0.057 0.129 0.359 0.559* 0.386* 0.238 
 (1.12) (0.31) (0.84) (1.19) (1.38) (2.38) (2.29) (0.73) 
(Inflation)2 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.01 -0.012* -0.01* -0.008 
 (-2.45) (-0.84) (-1.67) (-1.71) (1.55) (2.20) (2.36) (0.72) 
Turning 
 Point 15.0 14.0 14.3 16.1 18.0 23.3 19.3 14.9 
Note: All countries with less than 2 million people were excluded from the sample.   All observations with 
inflation above 40 percent were excluded.  Five-year period average data were used instead of yearly data 
in the regression.   “Non-low Income Countries” include OECD countries, middle income countries and 
non-OECD high income countries. “All countries” refers to all the countries in this table. 
 
 
 
 
 
      TABLE 3 
Inflation and Economic Growth 
All Countries by Decades 
Annual data 
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth 
(t-statistics in parentheses; P<0.05 = *, P<0.01 = **) 
Years 1961 - 70 1971 – 80 
Model : Pooled OLS Fixed  Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects Pooled-OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects 
# obs: 480 480 480 59 620 620 620 71 
Inflation 0.112 0.065 0.109 0.61* 0.084 0.06 0.084 0.047 
 (1.04) (.070) (1.24) (2.08) (0.99) (0.61) (0.92) (0.20) 
(Inflation)2 -.0005 -0.007* -0.006 -0.024* -0.005* -0.006* -0.005* 0.001 
 (1.47) (2.10) (1.74) (2.08) (2.00) (2.21) (2.03) (0.13) 
Turning 
 Point 11.2 4.6 9.1 12.7 8.4 5.0 8.4 -23.5 
 
Years 1981 - 90 1991- 2000 
Model : Pooled-OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects 
Pooled-
OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Between 
Effects 
# obs: 718 718 718 85 698 698 698 106 
Inflation -0.016 -0.118* -0.016 -0.016 0.025 -0.13 0.01 -0.189 
 (0.31) (1.98) (0.33) (0.17) (0.31) (1.69) (0.15) (1.32) 
(Inflation) 2 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.61) (0.08) (0.91) (1.30) (0.43) (1.70) (0.87) 
Turning  
Point - 59.0 - 2.7 4.2 -65.0 1.7 23.6 
Note: All countries with less than 2 million people were excluded from the sample.   All observations with 
inflation above 40 percent were excluded.  Five-year period average data were used instead of yearly data 
in the regression.   “Non-low Income Countries” include OECD countries, middle income countries and 
non-OECD high income countries. “All countries” refers to all the countries in this table. 
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Figure 1.  Inflation and Economic Growth, 1961 - 2000
Annual data are grouped into 5-year averages
Source:  See Appendix
 
 
